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INTRODUCTION
VariAbility: Beyond Sameness and Difference
Chris Mounsey
AS  E A R L Y  A S  1 9 8 2 , Henri-Jacques Stiker argued in A His-
tory of Disability for a celebration of the exceptional disabled body and against the 
“rhetoric of sameness” of the body that he claimed pervaded twentieth-century 
Europe. His book was couched in the Foucauldian philosophy of its time1 and 
warned that bringing the disabled body into the center of study should not “nor-
malize” it: should not deny its “abnormality” against which a majority defi ned 
itself as “normal.” For Stiker, disabled people should not be “assimilated” by a 
liberal culture that desired equality for all, but rather the disabled body could only 
be truly accepted by society in its incommensurateness. Acceptance of bodily dif-
ference, he argued, would produce a more fl exible and tolerant society.
While I largely agree with this position, I believe that Stiker chose the meth-
odology of analysis since, as he argued, “At the present time a historicist study of 
disability is not possible: there are too few in-depth studies. Th ere are only sound-
ings.”2 I believe that the time has now come for just such historicist readings of the 
body in all its variations, of which this collection of essays is intended to be a part. 
I hope to demonstrate in this introduction that we have reached a point in the 
progress of the study of the history of disability where detailed historicist readings 
are not only possible but also necessary. I shall also propose a new analysis of the 
body—VariAbility—that goes beyond the rhetoric of sameness and diff erence that 
concerned scholars in the twentieth century.
Disability is a narrow vein of study which, I believe, should not be sepa-
rated off  into its constituent parts (blindness, deafness, learning or physical dis-
ability, deformity, etc.) since each person’s disability (under whichever banner it 
may subtend) is unlike any other person’s, while the experience of being disabled 
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is the same for each disabled person. I am partially sighted and am accorded the 
same protections under legislation as all other vision impaired people in Brit-
ain. But I am also the fi rst with the group of symptoms that my physician has 
recorded. I am unique, diff erent, exceptional even among people “like me.” At 
the same time I share with my friend Robert, who is in a wheelchair, the desire 
to go for a walk by myself. Our experience of one of the limitations of our dis-
ability is the same, although our disabilities are very diff erent. We are the “same 
only diff erent.” Likewise, Robert and I are the “same only diff erent” from people 
who do not class themselves as disabled. We all have a body that has its diff erent 
capacities, we all make decisions about what we believe are the capabilities of 
that body and we all encounter other bodies with their peculiar capacities and 
capabilities and learn from them.
T h e  H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  S t u d y  o f  D i s a b i l i t y
Since Stiker, disability has been grouped with race, class, gender, and sexuality as a 
means for examining culture. Each analysis follows the poststructuralist method-
ology of bringing the excluded into the center of the debate, to demonstrate that 
white races defi ne themselves negatively against the nonwhite, the upper classes 
defi ne themselves negatively against the lower, men defi ne themselves negatively 
against women, heterosexuals defi ne themselves negatively against homosexuals, 
and the able-bodied defi ne themselves negatively against the disabled. In want of 
a shared characteristic, the poststructuralist methodology suggests that the domi-
nant “we” of a culture defi nes itself negatively as “not you” and casts its gaze at 
these fi ve (among other) out-groups to defi ne exactly what it is by excluding what 
it is not. By reversing the process of exclusion, or in the Foucauldian archaeology, 
by exploring carefully the history of the dominant group, the importance of those 
who have been excluded is demonstrated. Th e archaeology expects to fi nd the 
excluded groups to have been relatively acquiescent, or the victims of injustice, 
and explores the moment when political activism brought about change that made 
society more fl exible and tolerant. Th is methodology is clearly dominant in the 
study of disability after Stiker.
Susan Burch gives an excellent account of the various approaches to the 
study of disability published before 2005, which there is no need to rehearse fully 
here.3 Briefl y, there are two types, both of which follow the Foucauldian analysis, 
one with a focus on disability as a topic, and the other which explores the inter-
sections between disability and other theoretical concerns. Of the approaches to 
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disability alone we fi nd studies that are inclusive of a number of disabilities and 
others that treat exclusively with one. In Th e New Disability History: American 
Perspectives, Paul K. Longmore and Laurie Umansky state that “disability belongs 
with race, class, and gender as a ‘standard analytical tool’ of historical analysis” 
and present the history of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), an 
act they demonstrate was the result of disability activism and one that marked a 
change in cultural values.4 However, a question is left unanswered by the study. 
Because of its goal, despite containing essays on a wide range of disabilities, the 
collection does not delve into history before the nineteenth century. We might 
ask why, in a country which is still governed by an amended eighteenth-century 
constitution, there was no mention or amendment made to it which would ben-
efi t disabled people. Was it because impairment, as David Turner points out,5 was 
always understood as part of eighteenth-century life as a badge of frail humanity 
to which all would eventually succumb? Was it because, as the later history of Ellis 
Island exclusions of disabled immigrants demonstrates, because there was a tacit 
requirement of able-bodiedness in Lazarus’s lines:
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
Th e wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!6
Or had something dramatic happened to the view of the body in the shift between 
the eighteenth century and the nineteenth when the poem was written? Th is is 
not to say that Longmore and Umansky’s book is not a useful contribution to the 
history of disability, but that, since it concentrates on the events that led to the 
moment of change, the ADA, it calls out further work: a study of the prehistory 
of the history they give, which this book hopes to begin to address.
Writing exclusively about deafness, Lennard J. Davis’s Enforcing Normalcy 
also declares that “disability [is] the missing term in the race, class and gender 
triad” and at the same time that “deaf history is at once part of and separate from 
disability history.”7 Explaining this paradox, he argues for his Foucauldian meth-
odology that “the fi rst task is to understand and theorize the discourse of disability, 
to see that the object of disability studies is not the person using the wheelchair 
or the Deaf person but the set of social, historical, economic, and cultural pro-
cesses that regulate and control the way we think through the body.”8 Th e move 
is eminently poststructuralist and follows Derrida’s famous dictum “Il n’ya pas 
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d’hors text,” there is no outside of the text.9 In other words, everything we think 
and experience is textual. Th ere is no real world out there that is unmediated by 
language. Th e power of the move is that if disability is treated as a discourse then 
one disability is a representative of all disabilities and Davis can explore all through 
the study of one. But to this I would question whether or not Davis is guilty of 
making all disabilities the same and ignoring diff erence: the very “rhetoric of same-
ness” that Stiker criticized in 1982. It might equally be argued that disability is 
not only a discourse but also a lived experience, a “thinking through the body” of 
a disabled person: the “person using the wheelchair or the Deaf person” each of 
whom “think through” bodies that are the same but impaired in diff erent ways.
Th e third class of texts to which Burch also draws our attention are collec-
tions of essays that explore the intersections between disability and other theoreti-
cal concerns, such as Deviant Bodies edited by Jennifer Terry and Jacqueline Urla 
and Gendering Disability edited by Bonnie G. Smith and Beth Hutchinson.10 
Again, these are fascinating studies, which are made possible by the similarity of 
the Foucauldian analyses of sexuality, gender, and disability. Also, they mark the 
moment in the history of the academy when hiring took place each year at MLA 
for an expert in the next new theory. I have published extensively in the history 
of sexuality, and it might seem logical that this book attempt to shed light on 
disability with the same sort of theoretical intersection. However, as I suggested 
in my latest (last?) collection on sexuality,11 when Caroline Gonda and I set up 
the Queer People conferences at Christ’s College in Cambridge in 2002, we were 
searching for our foremothers and forefathers, for the experiences of people who 
shared our same-sex sexualities but who lived in the eighteenth century or earlier. 
We were working in parallel with the theoretical using a historicist methodology to 
describe case studies of sexualities. Careful not to read ourselves into our subjects, 
the papers at the conferences explored examples of sexualities within their own 
peculiar context. Th e methodology was derived from the belief that rather than 
reducible to a discourse or a set of discourses, sexuality is better explained as the 
body acting upon its mind’s desires. Sexuality was the link (or at least one link) 
between the mind and its body. And disability is perhaps another link, although 
it works in a diff erent way.
I believe that my experience of my homosexuality is radically diff erent from 
my experience of my vision impairment. I have always known I was a homosexual 
and never practiced any other form of sexuality, nor have I deliberately tried to 
pass as heterosexual. When I discuss my sexuality with friends, I explain that it was 
never possible for me to have tried heterosexuality since encounters with women 
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never led to my having an erection, while those with men did. My sexuality was 
never fl uid or changeable. Sexually, I could never be other than I always have been.
My sight problem is equally deep seated as I have, until recently, been able 
to “get by adequately” with the vision I was born with. However, although I always 
felt there was something wrong with my sight from an early age, because I had 
no experience of anyone else’s sight against which to gauge the defi ciencies of my 
own, I did not know how impaired my sight was until I was fi fty when a new set 
of circumstances led to my fi rst diagnosis. In consequence I have lived (or at least 
passed) as a sighted person most of my life. Th is is not to say that all experiences 
of sexuality and disability are the same as mine. On the contrary, I would argue 
that all experiences of sexuality and disability are diff erent and they should be 
treated as diff erent. But this is my point. My experiences of my sexuality and my 
disability are not commensurate with each other, and nor are they commensurate 
with those of other people. So I would question whether the intersections that are 
noticeable in the Foucauldian analyses of sexuality and disability may be products 
of the analytical tool rather than the history. My conclusion becomes clearer as 
vision impairment and homosexuality are remarkably the same for me politically 
since British laws protect me from discrimination both as a homosexual man and 
as a disabled man. My experience of each in my daily life may be very diff erent 
but nevertheless I have learned the value of antidiscrimination legislation to gain 
me equality of access.
For this reason I neither criticize nor repudiate the Foucauldian analysis, nor 
the political activism it underpinned. I am a benefi ciary of the work done to bring 
about the ADA and the British Equality Act of 2010. And while neither piece 
of legislation is perfect, and while I continue to struggle to get equal access for 
blind and partially sighted people to texts in the form they can use, which sighted 
people have, I believe that the Foucauldian part of disability history has reached 
its goal and we can move on to explore the histories of our disabled foremothers 
and forefathers in a diff erent way. What I am suggesting is that disability studies 
should follow the typical academic trajectory of a subject area beginning with 
the general and all-encompassing theory and move toward the specifi c, local, and 
personal. When I discuss my vision impairment, my friends who have poor vision 
tell me they understand my problem because they too are blind when they do not 
wear their glasses. But their sympathy is predicated against the medical algorithm 
of dysfunction, diagnosis, treatment, cure, which starts from an unstable binary 
between able-bodiedness and disability. However, where my bespectacled friends 
can understand the binary because their sight is correctable (when they are clothed 
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they can see properly and when not they are blind), mine is not correctable and 
never has been. I have no concept of what seeing properly is other than that which 
I have learned from talking to others. Th erefore, I can have no proper understand-
ing of the able-bodied and disabled binary.
It could therefore be argued further that the medical algorithm, which holds 
up cure as a possible future, might be the source of the idea that disability exists 
in a binary with able-bodiedness. My retinologist has discharged me because I am 
incurable. My future is not as a patient, patiently waiting to be cured. And it is for 
this reason I believe that we should begin our histories of disability from the dis-
abled person who by the very fact of being disabled is not in a socially constructed 
binary with able-bodiedness. Disabled people are defi ned by their disability, not by 
their relationship with the able-bodied. We therefore need not be interested in the 
able-bodied: they have histories of their own. We need histories that are about us.
R e c e n t  D e v e l o p m e n t s
Taking up the bibliography of disability history where Burch left off  in 2005,12 
there have been many new studies of disability in history of the types she listed, 
but all have remained within the Foucauldian fold.13 However, embedded within 
them at several places is the suggestion that lived experience of disabled people 
might be a way forward. Again I shall be brief rather than comprehensive and 
explore only three texts, the fi rst being a special issue of Radical History Review, 
edited by Teresa Meade and David Serlin.14 Th e collection of essays continues the 
history of the ADA and similar laws worldwide, exploring civil disobedience tac-
tics by disabled people. Most exciting for me is a declaration in the introduction 
where Meade and Serlin declare war not only on the eff ects of oppression of and 
injustice suff ered by disabled people but also on the results of poststructuralist 
nihilism, declaring that:
Defi nitions and meanings attached to disability are always historically 
and culturally specifi c and never ideologically neutral. Yet this does not 
mean that disability is merely an artifact of poststructural dematerializa-
tion of the individual body of subjective experience.15
Furthermore, the collection is billed by its publishers in a way that suggests it 
parallels the local and specifi c of the queer project, “disclos[ing] how the ways in 
which we defi ne ‘disability’ may expose biases and limitations of a given historical 
moment rather than a universal truth.”16 Together these two propositions, that 
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disability is an embodied state rather than textual and that the analyses should 
be confi ned to the disabled body in particular historical moments, might suggest 
that the collection fulfi lls the criteria I suggested above. Th e cover photograph of 
CeCe Weeks, a disabled activist who chained himself to a wheelchair in Berkeley, 
California, seems to confi rm this, as does the discussion of the historical moment 
of his protest about a cinema showing the extraordinary 1978 fi lm about disabil-
ity, Coming Home, which could not admit wheelchair-bound viewers.17 However, 
the discussions of individuals tend to fl ash by while the greater (if not universal) 
conclusions are drawn. Th e underlying problem with this otherwise excellent col-
lection becomes clear when the editors note the paucity of premodern histories of 
disability. Th ey wonder whether this is
because academic scholarship on disability rests largely on articula-
tions of individualism and bodily sovereignty that have been shaped by 
constitutional democracies in North America and Europe since the late 
eighteenth century.18
Th is is the moment when the analytical tool, which is still at its heart Foucauldian, 
hijacks what is an otherwise wonderful project. Although the editors’ intention is 
to present micro-histories, the concept of social construction is still dominant not 
only of disability but also of the sense of the individuality, which can see itself as 
disabled, the victim of injustice, and so be moved to activism. Meade and Serlin 
end on a note of hope that their collection will stimulate further research, and 
there has certainly been an increase in the production of historical work on dis-
ability. But the question of whether this new work marks a move forward meth-
odologically is still not clear.
One way forward has been to widen the fi eld of study to put an earlier date 
on the “articulations of individualism and bodily sovereignty” than the late eigh-
teenth century, as does Kim E. Neilsen’s A Disability History of the United States.19 
Another has been to deepen the level of detail of the history of the disabled sub-
jects under study, to encompass more of their political, social, and cultural selves as 
does David M. Turner’s Disability in eighteenth-century England: Imagining Physical 
Impairment.20
Neilsen’s approach is to present the whole history of the United States from 
pre-Columbian times to the present day through the lens of disability, an unprec-
edented task, or as she puts it:
No-one has attempted to create a wide-ranging chronological history 
narrative told through the lives of people with disabilities.21
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With so wide a historical sweep, the “lives of people with disabilities” must nec-
essarily be explained carefully, so Neilsen spends some time defi ning, “Who are 
people with disabilities? And conversely what does it mean to be nondisabled?” 
Th e process does not lead to a defi nition but rather to a statement of intent:
Disability is not the story of someone else, it is the story of someone 
we love, the story of who we are and who we may become, and it is 
undoubtedly the story of our nation.
However, while declaring that
this is not to argue that we should all hold hands and cheerfully insist 
that we are all disabled in some way or another
Th e underlying binary between disability and “ableism” remains the book’s main 
analytical tool. In her attempt to give us a history that is not freighted with the 
negative view of disability, which she will go on to demonstrate was prevalent in 
much of the history of the United States, Neilsen cannot rid herself of a binary ap-
proach that turns the negative stereotype upon those whom she will term “ableist.”
To attempt a greater depth of engagement than Nielsen, David M. Turner’s 
Disability in eighteenth-century England explores a narrower fi eld in terms of time 
and place (eighteenth-century England) and disability (only deformity).22 It is a 
really useful survey of that century, which by closing in the focus on deformity, is 
able to elicit details that more general studies cannot (nor are intended to). But the 
balance between the particular and the general remains weighted toward the gen-
eral because Turner is still using race, class, and gender alongside disability as tools 
of analysis, which at times occlude some of the more subtle questions that arise.
For example, in his sketch of the life of William Hay, who wrote Deformity: 
An Essay in 1754,23 Turner notes that “he [Hay] ‘never much valued’ the mock-
heroic epithet ‘My Lord’ that was commonly applied to people of small stature 
yet it was ‘grown into such a habit with the Rabble.’” Following his analytical 
principles, Turner glosses this with the comment that “those who were ‘deformed’ 
could expect little of the respect that normally accrued to rank.”24 But how can 
we be certain that this true to Hay’s response to name calling? Did he necessarily 
see himself as superior to those who carried him through the streets of London in 
sedan chairs? Hay was not entitled to be called “My Lord” being only a member of 
the landed gentry. Was perhaps his label of “the Rabble” given only to those who 
called him “My Lord”? Hay was not just a small man with a curved spine, he was 
a poet, politician, husband, and father. Perhaps his response to chair-men25 who 
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called him “My Lord” was a defense mechanism against casual abuse he used in 
front of his wife and children? After all, Hay was a Whig member of parliament 
and his party stood for social equality rather than noblesse oblige.
Turner’s book, of course, does not have room for such detailed speculations 
since it is trying to cover the whole eighteenth century. Th e section on Hay is only 
seven pages long and although it is longer than the 1,000 word entry for William 
Hay in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (ODNB),26 Turner adds little 
factually to the story told there. What is interesting in a comparison between 
these two accounts is that while Turner describes Hay’s life from the perspective 
of his deformity, Stephen Taylor’s ODNB entry does not mention that Hay was 
“born a hunchback dwarf” until the second to last paragraph, although we are told 
chronologically that his sight was damaged after smallpox while he was studying 
law in London. What would seem to be going on in the two versions of Hay is that 
Turner is centering on Hay the disabled person, while Taylor is giving us Hay the 
politician and writer. But this produces anomalies in each account. When Taylor 
tells us of the depth of Hay’s dedication to Whiggism and its leader (after Robert 
Walpole) the Duke of Newcastle, Th omas Pelham-Holles, he evidences:
Th e link with the powerful Newcastle connection at which this dedica-
tion hinted was confi rmed on 3 May 1731 by Hay’s marriage to Eliza-
beth Pelham (1709–1793), the second daughter of Th omas Pelham of 
Catsfi eld Place, Sussex, and a cousin of the duke.
But this information is given before Taylor’s readers would know (if they knew 
nothing about Hay) that he was deformed and a dwarf. Th e wedding is thus pre-
sented without a sense of how it was understood in the eighteenth century. Was it 
seen as strange for a deformed man to marry at all? Was the marriage considered 
dynastic (as Taylor’s account suggests) or companionate? How were the four re-
sulting children received? It might have been that Elizabeth loved and cherished 
William and their marriage bed was a happy one as well as fruitful. Nevertheless, 
we ought not avoid the question about how Hay saw himself as one partner in the 
alliance with Elizabeth, after all he published his Essay on Deformity a year before 
his death, which suggests that it was very important to him that it was published, 
and in it he records that he was never free from casual abuse about his shape. Was 
Hay’s wife subject to the same vilifi cation? Did Hay suff er when he thought about 
the things that were said to the woman he loved? Was his suff ering from abuse and 
the consequent desire to be treated as equal to those who were not small and with 
curved spines the reason for his Whiggish principles? Th e example demonstrates 
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that to treat disabled people as though their disability were marginal to their lives 
can miss something of great importance to them and theirs. Again, to be fair, it 
might be asked whether an ODNB entry is the right place for such speculations. 
But should a major and life defi ning disability be mentioned only in passing?
Turner’s approach to Hay is also open to accusations of missing subtleties 
while putting a spin on his subject. And the fact of the Essay being an early ex-
ample of a fi rst-hand account of disability perhaps makes it more important than 
the rest of Hay’s life to a book on deformity. Turner notes that Hay published 
Remarks on the Laws relating to the Poor, with Proposals for their better Relief and 
Employment (1731).27 But this is the only one mention of the wide range of other 
texts of which Hay was author, including An Essay on Civil Government (1728); 
Mount Caburn: A Poem (1730); Religio Philosophi: or, the principles of morality and 
Christianity illustrated from a view of the universe, and man’s situation in it (1753); 
Martials Epigrammata Selecta (1755).28 Confronted with such riches, one wonders 
whether we ought to read Hay only for his contribution to the way we understand 
deformity. Hay was after all a politician who left one of the most complete parlia-
mentary diaries of the early eighteenth century.29
If we do not give a full context to Hay’s life and writing, can we begin to 
pick up the subtleties of how he understood himself as a deformed man living in 
the eighteenth century? To give an example, in his Essay Hay attacks Francis Bacon 
for making the stereotypical claim that people with irregular bodies have twisted 
minds.30 Exonerating his subject, Turner notes that on the republication of Hay’s 
complete writing,31 the Critical Review glossed Hay’s Essay with a comparison with 
Alexander Pope:
Hay’s good-humoured treatment of his subject was contrasted with the 
work of another writer with spinal curvature, Alexander Pope—de-
scribed [in the Critical Review] as “the irritable poet of Twickenham”—
whose barbed attacks in the Dunciad and other satirical works (together 
with other anti-social qualities of his character that [Samuel] Johnson 
had described) seemed to embody the “scorn” that Bacon had attributed 
to “deformed” people.32
For Turner, the Critical Review would thus seem to suggest that Hay was the “good 
deformed man” while Pope was the “bad.” But what Turner fails to explore is the 
detail of Pope’s and Hay’s knowledge of one another and one another’s work, es-
pecially while Hay was writing his translation and imitation of Martial’s Epigrams, 
which are as barbed as Pope’s, and use Pope’s name over and over again as the 
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modern literary model for his satire.33 In the light of Hay’s deference to Pope, it 
would seem diffi  cult to argue as the Critical Review did, and the diff erence between 
the two men as poets may be suggested instead to be that Pope, the professional 
poet, had the temerity to publish his barbed attacks while he and his victims were 
still alive, while Hay, the poet politician, was careful of his public reputation and 
waited until he and his victims were dead before his barbed attacks were published 
by the best London publisher, Robert Dodsley. Hay himself would seem to make 
this case when he questions his decision to publish in his imitation of Martial’s 
Epigram IV, which is used as a preface to his book:
Why in Pall-Mall with Dodsley will you dwell,
When in my desk you still might lodge so well?34
Th e reason Hay thought his translations ought to remain hidden in his drawer was 
that he like Martial (and Pope) might be attacked:
You who castration dread, who hate my strokes,
And grave correction of your idle jokes, . . .35
When we read the rest of the imitated epigrams, it becomes clear that Hay, like 
Martial, and like Pope, did not hide who he attacked. For example, Epigram XI 
names a phthisic Lady Mary Belair who is being wooed for her fortune as she dies 
of consumption:
To Lady Mary Belair makes addresses;
Presents he makes, sighs, presses, and professes.
Is she so fair?—No lady so ill off .
What is so captivating then?—Her cough.36
In want of careful research, Lady Mary Belair and her suitor remain unknown to 
us for the present, but the pair would have been easily identifi able to readers of 
the epigram in manuscript when it was fresh and the barbed comment would have 
stung its targets or given rise to laughter in its readers.
But if this would seem to give the lie to Hay’s attack on Bacon and make 
him out to be like Pope, and both like Richard III, and all “determined to prove a 
villain,” then we miss out on the fun and the intention of eighteenth-century satire 
and imitation. What Hay, Pope, and Samuel Johnson attempted in their satirical 
imitations of the classical poets, respectively Martial, Virgil, and Juvenal, was to 
give classical weight to their jokes at the expense of the vanity of human wishes 
that they saw around them. But satire had been the dominant form of poetry only 
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in the early century and Pope is attacked in the Critical Review in 1796 because 
a form of writing more at ease with sensibility had taken its place after 1760 and 
Pope was out of favor. Hay comes away clean footed in comparison because his 
victims were never named and Lady Mary long dead before the epigram was pub-
lished, and Hay himself died in the year of publication of his Martial. But the fact 
that the Critical Review could still make the attack on Pope’s shape, and Samuel 
Johnson’s ticks and physical oddities were the subject of mimicry by James Boswell 
and David Garrick, while Hay’s attitude to his is applauded requires further study 
of these men as whole men, living and working in the eighteenth century, and 
negotiating their personal disability with dignity and humor.
Two thirds of this project has been carried out already by Helen Deutsch 
in Resemblance and Disgrace, and Loving Dr. Johnson,37 two books which laid the 
ground work for much of what I have argued needs to be done to deepen and 
widen the scope of disability history in the eighteenth century. Each is a book 
length study of a disabled person that explores his life and work. Resemblance and 
Disgrace reads Alexander Pope “for deformity,” that is to say it explores the inter-
sections between Pope’s work and his self-presentation as its author, his language 
and subject matter, his poetical intentions and his detractors’ criticisms, from 
whom the title comes. Deutsch reads Pope’s deformity as a metaphor of literature 
and how literature works to explore the experience of embodiment. While her 
book is specifi c to Pope it is also as wide ranging as Pope’s infl uence on British 
poetry, but at the same time Deutsch is writing against the traditions of Pope criti-
cism that are, she argues, “blind[. . .] to the way in which deformity for Pope is 
both a biographical fact and a literary method, a mode of conceiving.”38
Extending her visual metaphor Deutsch explains the problem of a deformed 
man writing poetry that imitates a classical and therefore supposedly perfect pre-
existing form in the neo-classical period when representations of perfect physical 
forms were a common subject of painting and ceramics as well as poetry:
What I hope will become visible in the process is the function of Pope’s 
deformity as a sign of the monstrosity of imitative authorship, a phe-
nomenon which caused Lady Mary Wortley Montagu to brand both the 
poet’s body and his printed book “at once Resemblance and Disgrace” 
of originals both artifi cial and natural.39
What “becomes visible” in Resemblance and Disgrace is the balance between the 
personal and the society in which people fi nd and defi ne themselves, which is 
clearly negotiated in literature: which is perhaps the function of literature. Th us, in 
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this case, Deutsch argues that “literary imitation is Pope’s generic portrait,”40 while 
at the same time the book explores Pope’s poetry as the topos of the encounter 
between the global and the local:
While Windsor Forest expands a garden to encompass an English empire, 
Pope’s garden at Twickenham creates a counter-empire within the con-
fi nes of individuality and with the seemingly stable material of land.41
Later in the book imitative poetry presents an encounter between the classical 
(defi ned by its having survived from time immemorial) and the ephemerality of 
an individual human life, in the fi gure of the medal, or coin.
[It is the medal’s] defense against entropy and chaos in the shape of a 
human body which Pope wants print to perform in Horace’s likeness.42
In these examples (as well as others in the book) Pope’s curved spine intervenes in 
the concept of “imitation” as his body’s unlikeness to the classical athlete imposes 
itself upon his attempts to create the most beautiful classical imitations in poetry.
While Deutsch’s work has set us a wonderful example of how to proceed, 
Resemblance and Disgrace has not exhausted the subject of imitation and disability 
in the eighteenth century. If I may enter into a debate with Deutsch about her 
interpretation of William Hay—and debate about interpretation is that on which 
literary scholarship thrives—she argues:
Hay closes his text with two complimentary gestures. He prints a “Last 
Will” in which he leaves his body to science and asks that it be opened, 
made a biological specimen and preserved in a medical museum (part of 
what he wishes to display is the effi  cacy of a particular brand of soap for 
ingestion as a cure for various ills). Th e body which he recommends as 
both educational oddity and potential commodity.43
I would like to off er an alternate reading of Hay’s intention for leaving his body 
to Sir Hans Sloane: which is to demonstrate that his deformed body is still a body 
that can act as an example for other bodies. Hay’s deformed body is an adequate 
“imitation” (or perhaps iteration) of any other body since it works in the same 
way and can be helped by the use of a soap based medication to prevent bladder 
stones. Hay’s body is the same only diff erent as that of the classical athlete. Hay’s 
attitude toward himself seems also to point out how much he thought he was “the 
same only diff erent” from other people and that while Pope thought himself unfi t 
for marriage, Hay did marry and had four children.
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It is interpretations and comparisons between the experiences of disabled 
people that fuel the current collection, so I include this dialogue with Deutsch as 
an example of how important it is to continue to work with disabled subjects and 
to develop the methodologies with which we make such interpretations.
V a r i A b i l i t y :  A  N e w  A n a l y t i c a l  T o o l
As early as 1999, Elizabeth Bredberg noticed that
in disability history, . . . accounts of the lived experience of disabled 
people remain very much under-represented. Disability history, in ironic 
consequence, seems to sustain the depersonalized and institutionalized 
representation of disabled people that its authors undoubtedly deplore.44
At the same time the paper notes that there are several collections of biographies 
of deaf people, and she concludes with the suggestion that
any real development in disability history will come from the work of 
investigators who have developed interpretive competence with [primary 
experiential accounts] as well.45
However, the question is left unanswered as to what “interpretive competence” 
might be, but I believe this is the nub of the matter, although probably in a diff er-
ent way from that which Bredberg intended. If we put together the undoubted fact 
that at this moment there is more work in deaf history than any other disability46 
with the question of interpretive competence we might fi nd an answer. Deaf peo-
ple write books because they can use them. Th ere is a deaf university (Gallaudet) in 
Washington DC, which has an active academic publishing house. Th ere are even 
two pictorial histories of the deaf, one of Britain and one of the United States.47
Th e reason I draw attention to this undoubted fact is that the deaf even 
call themselves “the people of the eye.” Although much of their history has been 
a fi ght to use sign language as their main means of communication, the written 
word is the place where this fi ght has been recorded for posterity. Sign language is 
evanescent, like speech, and disappears as the signs are made, to become a personal 
mental image in the signer’s and signee’s minds. A conversation can be remem-
bered, but memory of it becomes more and more indistinct as time passes. On the 
other hand, words on a page exist forever and can be studied again and again in 
a relationship between the eye and the colored characters. Words on a page may 
also be interpreted again and again, but they remain identical each time they are 
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seen. An eye can skim in many diff erent ways across the page to pick up diff erent 
nuances of meaning by noticing connections between words that exist simultane-
ously and come in and out of focus as the eye moves over the page. Sign language 
and speech leave only a passing impression that can never be revisited.
For text-disabled people, access to words is always like sign language or 
speaking. We also have our own language for which we have fought, braille, but 
touching white dots on a page, is as temporal an experience as listening to a voice. 
Th ere is no simultaneity equivalent to perusing words on a page when reading 
requires the temporal pass of the fi nger. A braille reader can never stop and ponder 
a single word and take in all its letters in one view.
I have no competence with braille as I could learn to read print as a child, 
so I cannot comment on the experience of reading that way. My main language 
of textual communication is aural: either text-to-voice (for work) or audio book 
(for pleasure). In either form text cannot come to me simultaneously and I have 
to study it in a linear temporality, although I fold time back and forth as I click 
the “back 30 seconds” button to pick up pieces of information I have missed in a 
moment of inattention as the voice moves smoothly on.
Th e process of re-educating myself to read this way took about two years, 
and now I can read and grade student essays at 120 words a minute: a speed that 
my students cannot even hear as language. I can even hear spelling mistakes. Dur-
ing the process of relearning to read, I was writing my book, Being the Body of 
Christ,48 which was intended to have a wider range of authors, one to a chapter, 
and only about 10,000 words on E.F Benson’s David Blaize trilogy. But I fi nally 
gave up on trying to read paper books after writing the chapters on Oscar Wilde, 
Alan Hollinghurst, Jeanette Winterson, and Edward Carpenter, and turned to text 
to voice. In the event, the detail I picked up from having to listen linearly word 
by word to Benson’s lovely books, led me to writing 40,000 words on them. My 
whole method of working changed. Since I could never read properly, I would spy 
out useful phrases by skimming over text very quickly with one eye held tightly 
shut to fi nd relevant passages by recognizing word shapes, which I would then 
write out or type in order to read properly. After reading by sight became impos-
sible I had to listen to every word, word by word, going back and forth across the 
text so as to remember which incident came before which. Until fi ve years ago I 
could retain the shape of paragraphs on a page and hold a mental image of the 
page, or the copied out text, to bring me the experience of seeing words simultane-
ously. Now linear time has replaced simultaneity for me and I would argue that 
this is another language experience equally valid as sign language or braille.
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Now, text-to-voice has become so dominant a language of work for me that 
when I am at a conference and hear a paper which describes the work of “Foo-
coh” I wonder for a moment whose work is being referenced, until I remember the 
sound pattern “Fow-oo-coh-ault” which my computer reads to me when speaking 
the letters “Foucault.”49
When I am reading for pleasure, and turn to audio books, that is, books that 
are performed for the listener by a professional reader, I touch the limits of my 
new access to text. If I am unfamiliar with a sound pattern I can lose out on levels 
of meaning, as for example, recently when I was reading Robert Jordan’s fantasy 
novel, Th e Eye of the World,50 I heard the sound pattern “Eye-Siddeye,” which the 
text tells me are some kind of magicians, but the sound has no obvious homopho-
nic metaphors to the ear. I checked out the word and discovered that it was spelled 
“Aes Sedai” in the printed version of the text, which abounds with suggestions of 
Aois Dàna (Aes Dana) the Old Irish race of bards, whom they resemble.
Th us, I might argue, in work and leisure, I am more disabled than deaf 
readers. When I have fi nished this book you are now reading and it comes back to 
me for proofi ng, I will not be able easily to understand these last two paragraphs 
with text-to voice. A deaf person only has to look at them to understand them.
But here I am not trying to set up a hierarchy of disability where deaf/blind 
people might be “more disabled” than either blind or deaf people. And there is 
an excluded third party to the discussion, those who can both hear and see, what 
of them? Is their relationship to us the visually impaired, and you the deaf, the 
most important thing to know? I do not think so. Th e most important thing that 
identifi es us is our diff ering capacities. We visually impaired access text the way we 
can, the deaf the way they can, each in our own peculiar way, and those who can 
both see and hear in theirs. Access for each group is diff erent, valid, and has its 
strengths and weaknesses. It would be otiose to suggest that one type of access is 
better than another. But varying capacities might be a useful fact on which to base 
an analysis of people in history. Furthermore, since no one is totally “able” (in this 
example, to be totally able might be to see all words all at once on a page) and no 
one totally “disabled” (with no access to language at all), then we might dispense 
with the word “disabled” with its binary opposite, and call everyone “VariAble.” 
I would argue that this addresses the question that arose in reading Kim Neilsen’s 
Disabled History of the United States since we no longer have to defi ne who are the 
disabled and who the able. We are all simply VariAble people.51
When we turn to look for more detail about the whole lives of historical 
people, VariAbility might also be of some help. VariAbility is no means transhis-
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torical, as it would expect blind people in the eighteenth century to be diff erent 
from blind people in the twenty-fi rst century in the way they were treated or 
understood, in the same way that we would expect that every person in each 
century had diff erent experiences of and with their peculiar abilities. But Vari-
Ability would nevertheless expect that someone who was blind in the eighteenth 
century would have similar diffi  culties in, say, accessing text, as blind people in 
the twenty-fi rst century, although they would understand themselves in a diff er-
ent way and expect diff erent solutions. Above all, VariAbility would not suggest 
that diff erence was binary. Deaf people in the eighteenth-century were as diff er-
ent from blind people as they were diff erent from those who thought themselves 
normal. Th ere never was a reference point of “normal” that defi ned those who 
were not. VariAbility would expect that every “normal” person was as diff erent 
(VariAble) as every other “normal” person.
VariAbility is a concept that enshrines uniqueness, has the patience to 
discover the peculiarities of each individual and by so doing captures particular 
people rather than an “institutionalized representation of disabled people.” As 
such it is a useless concept for those who are seeking “power relations” between 
groups who defi ne themselves as the same against an other. But it is a good way 
to notice people in history.
If this sounds diffi  cult, then try to untangle my experience of sight. I have 
always been visually impaired, but as I used to be able to see texts, I was educated 
in a mainstream school that did not know that I had a visual anomaly so did not 
treat me as disabled. Instead, as I coaxed my mind to use the vision I had to fi nd 
some pattern to the words on the page, I was thought to be educationally subnor-
mal. Now I am a full professor of English Literature although I cannot work with 
paper texts. When asked to describe my experience of vision, I say that “I can see 
everything but I can make out nothing.” If I see letters and am asked to say what 
I’ve seen I say “letters.” If I see a friend it is more than likely a stranger wearing my 
friend’s face. If someone comes towards me with a smile (which I can obviously 
see) I greet them with the name I think goes with them and am often wrong. So I 
must have a visual memory of the friend that I cannot and could never see.
Have patience with me, don’t simply call me blind, since I can see, or 
stupid as my school did, since I am really quite clever. Do not think of me as 
some “Other” who you are defi nitely not, since I share a lot of visual (and other) 
experiences with you. I like modern architecture (it is big and does not move 
and has little detail) and I love to walk around cities with you. Just don’t let me 
try to cross a road because I cannot see the traffi  c since it moves. Protect me and 
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cherish me, not as diff erent from you but as a VariAble of you. I am “the same 
only diff erent” from you. My visual capacity is not the same as yours. But it has 
its recompenses. Learning to read with text-to-voice brought me a wholly new 
way of working that has enhanced my life immeasurably, and I recommend it to 
you even if you can read paper texts.
However, those recompenses are in my conscious decision to accept or 
deny. My oldest friend has macular degeneration, another genetic condition, 
that means she has like me had to face blindness at the height of her active life. 
We meet regularly and laugh and weep together about our past and present and 
futures. But if we share the experience of losing sight in middle age, we do not 
share a future. My friend does not understand the recompenses of being blind. 
She refuses to be registered blind or get a travel permit or read audio books. 
She will not go to art galleries anymore because she says “she cannot see the 
wall, let alone the painting.” She would not go with me to the recent Edvard 
Munch exhibition in London52 even though some of the paintings represented 
his experience of her condition. Instead she sits at home poring over visual text 
magnifi ed to the highest level her kindle will manage, reading for half an hour 
a day before she is too exhausted and has to sleep.
My response to what I understand as a “same only diff erent” future has 
been to accept my visual anomaly with its limitations and to relearn how to read. 
Furthermore, nothing will keep me out of art galleries where I stand and peer at 
artworks through my dark glasses. I used to despise conceptual art, but now prefer 
the gross visual stimulus to the intricate detail of a pre-Raphaelite painting.
What is diff erent between me and my friend with macular degeneration is 
our capability to live with our altered capacity. Capability I understand as the mind’s 
facility to accept diff erence and live with it or deny it. I can accept the physical con-
straints of my visual impairment, my friend cannot. Capability is experiential and 
nonjudgmental. It is not predictable and adds to the peculiarity of an individual. It 
is another element to be added to capacity as a way of noticing people in history. But 
if I seem to have set up yet another binary between capacity as body and capability 
as mind, then I must now point out that both capacity and capability only become 
apparent in encounters with others, and the three exist as a triplet.
What I want to maintain in the analysis of VariAbility, is the immediacy of 
individual lived experience. I believe that the three elements capacity, capability, 
and encounter, (which are not necessary to the central concept) can help to guide 
the analysis of experience, and highlight the relationship between body mind and 
other people as in the example I have just given.
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T h e  E s s a y s
Th e essays illustrate diff erent aspects of the subtitle of this volume: the Idea of Dis-
ability in the Long Eighteenth Century, and separate themselves neatly into three 
sections, the Methodological, the Conceptual, and the Experiential. Th e fi rst 
group consider philosophies of the body before and after empiricism, and present 
an overall picture suggesting that empiricism, which might be argued to be the 
basis of the current scientifi c way people understand themselves as agents in the 
world, is fi lled with anxiety about failures in its method to explain diff erent experi-
ences of embodiment, and which, in the eighteenth century, was only one way to 
understand the body in all its forms—the others of which are more inclusive of 
aberration and empathetic toward diff erence. Th e second group of essays explores 
ways disability was conceptualized in the eighteenth century, in terms of literature 
and public consciousness, and we discover how literature disguises its representa-
tions of disability, while periodical and pamphlet literature was starkly direct in 
exposing the terrible tortures infl icted upon disabled people—especially the men-
tally disabled. Th e third group of essays, which explore the lives of disabled people 
throughout the century, demonstrates the dynamic tension between the personal 
desire for disabled people to be accepted and treated as autonomous individuals, 
while at the same time wanting to be part of groups either of other disabled people 
or of a wider community. In fact they demonstrate the way in which disabled 
people expressed concerns about their lives typical of the human social animal.
T h e o r i z i n g  D i s a b i l i t y — M e t h o d o l o g i c a l  E s s a y s :
Th ese consider philosophical writing dating between 1663 and 1788, a time in 
which the understanding of disability altered dramatically. We begin with Mar-
garet Cavendish, whose natural philosophy was based upon an all but Hermetic 
view of “as above so below,” that led her to reject ideas of superiority or inferiority 
between individuals based upon physical or mental diff erence. We then move to 
John Locke, the founder of empiricism in 1680, who believed that the basis of 
knowledge was observability, but who, faced with the lack of anything to observe, 
broke his own epistemological rules in his explanation of mental illness. Quite 
probably understanding the problems that empiricism set up, Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, Lord Shaftesbury, turned in 1711 to moral philosophy, but also founded 
his philosophy on a fl aw. While he believed in the harmony of “the aesthetic trinity 
of beauty, truth, and virtue” he could not believe that a disabled friend whom he 
knew to have been moral before his physical alteration could change inside. Lastly, 
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we turn to Th omas Reid who returned to the body as the ground of philosophical 
enquiry, but this time in terms of power. Th e body seen as a whole is, for Reid, 
complete in itself, and wanting nothing, be it missing a sense (Reid was deaf ) or 
a physical or mental capacity.
Working on the late seventeenth-century natural philosopher, Margaret 
Cavendish, Holly Nelson and Sharon Alker’s essay demonstrates that before em-
piricism there was no simple binary opposition between able bodies and disabled 
bodies, which might be used in Foucauldian negative defi nition. Rather they argue 
that Cavendish believed in a diversity of physical and mental states akin to my 
own idea of VariAbility. Th is means that from as early as the seventeenth century, 
the language of superiority and inferiority is undermined. Nelson and Alker also 
explain that Cavendish treated only with the body and left incorporeal spiritual 
truths to churchmen, which took the religious sting out of disability. For her pains, 
Cavendish was routinely thought to be mad herself, though she does not seem to 
have cared much about the appellation.
Jess Keiser’s paper examines the problem with eighteenth-century empiri-
cism’s understanding of mental disability by examining a contradiction in John 
Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding. Although Locke states plainly that 
his work will not “meddle with the Physical Consideration of the Mind,” (that is 
neurophysiology, a term coined by Locke’s teacher, Th omas Willis) his writings 
on madness point to the fl ux of animal spirits in the brain as a probable cause for 
mental derangement, thus: “the brain tricks the mad into perceiving otherwise 
irrational connections in the mind’s ideas.” In spite of this contradiction, Locke’s 
writings on madness share with the rest of the Essay a concern that we cannot 
discover the mechanisms of the body because the real source of those mechanisms 
remains just out of sight, an insoluble problem, which led to the skepticism of 
David Hume and George Berkeley, and Shaftesbury’s turn to describe morality. By 
surveying the similarities in these disparate moments in the Essay, Keiser’s paper 
brings to light the anxiety around the hidden interactions of body and brain that 
pervades Locke’s writings, to which we might conclude: empiricism is not a fi t tool 
for explaining the complexities of how the disabled body works.
Paul Kelleher’s essay begins where Locke’s methodology failed—trying to 
comment upon a subject that could not be observed—in this case moral philoso-
phy. However, Shaftesbury’s “vision of moral harmony” as an “inward anatomy” 
in Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711) was also not free from 
criticism for its treatment of disabled subjects, this time that his work follows the 
Baconian model that the outwardly deformed must be morally deformed also. As 
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Kelleher writes: “moral philosophy addresses the fundamental question of what 
constitutes the good life: what is a life well lived, it asks, and how is such a life con-
ducted in a world shared by others and sustained in a world comprised of materials 
and objects? Any answers to these questions necessarily implicate those who, at dif-
ferent times, have been regarded as monstrous, deformed, freakish, deviant, or dis-
abled. As even a cursory glance reveals, the pages of moral-philosophical treatises 
are replete with invocations—or more accurately, deprecations—of “deformity.” 
Nevertheless, after a careful reading of the Characteristics, and a brief look at Shaft-
esbury’s philosophical notes, the Askêmata (recently published in full for the fi rst 
time), Kelleher demonstrates that if we “respect the ambiguities of any body of 
thought” we discover that Shaftesbury did not simply accept “the aesthetic trinity 
of beauty, truth, and virtue” and denigrate “the deformed, false and vicious.” For 
example, if a friend whom we know to be morally virtuous travels in “the remotest 
parts of the East and the hottest countries of the South” and becomes physically 
deformed by disease, our friend has not changed morally because they are now 
ugly: “It is not we who change when our complexion or shape changes.” Th us, 
Kelleher argues that Shaftesbury’s aestheticization of morality—or what comes to 
the same, his moralization of aesthetics—does not overtly argue that what we today 
refer to as “disability” is synonymous with “moral deformity.”
Emile Bojesen explores the way the Scottish philosopher Th omas Reid criti-
cizes the binary of disabled able-bodied, fi nding it the product of empiricism and 
skepticism. As an alternative, Reid off ers a common sense philosophy of power, 
where power is what diff erentiates beings with a “will” from those without, and 
makes them the author of their actions and their life. Th e idea is a complex one, 
the more so since empiricism and skepticism have become so engrained in our cul-
ture, but the outcome is liberating since, according to Reid, the agent has power 
over their dis/ability rather than their dis/ability having power over them. Power 
dictates the direction of the will and locates the will as being subject to the various 
bodily faculties: emphasizing the variable experience of the body and mind before 
the direction of the will. No two bodies are the same, be they able or disabled, but 
they are all fully capable of doing what they can.
T h i n k i n g  a b o u t  D i s a b i l i t y — C o n c e p t u a l  E s s a y s
At the heart of the study of any historical artifact is the question of where to look 
for evidence, and when looking for evidence of disability, we have largely to rely 
upon texts. However, texts come in many forms, and the two essays here explore 
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three types, the novel, the periodical and the pamphlet, which pour out their 
riches in diff erent ways.
Anna K. Sagal’s paper explores the intersections between language and dis-
ability in Laurence Sterne’s character of Uncle Toby in Tristram Shandy. What be-
comes more complex here, is the fact that although Toby can be read as an equiva-
lent of a modern traumatized war veteran, he was also an eighteenth-century man 
who used that century’s language to express and come to terms with his disability, 
which makes for a fascinating comparison. Th e language games which so famously 
defi ne Sterne’s novel do not cease to be played when we try to pin down any of 
its characters, who are “in search for their own comprehensible narratives within 
a larger narrative,” which might be a personal search for the meaning of one’s dis-
ability. What becomes tragic, however, is that this meaning must be hidden within 
the language games themselves as a puzzle that needs to be solved in order to be 
expressed as disability is too awful to be expressed on the polite page of the novel.
Dana Gliserman Kopans’s essay argues that the claim that literary portrayals 
of false imprisonment for insanity are overstated needs to be reconsidered in the 
light of contemporary periodical and pamphlet accounts which fed widespread 
fears that the “trade in lunacy” was so voracious that no one was safe. While the 
essay considers the problem of false imprisonment for insanity in a case docu-
mented by Daniel Defoe in Th e Review, and two others by the falsely imprisoned 
James Bruckshaw and James Belcher, the punishment handed out to the unnamed 
woman and the two men must have been typical of that meted out to those who 
were really mentally disabled. Th e essay gives a truly harrowing account of the 
dreadful treatment of mentally disabled people in the eighteenth century, set 
within the contemporary regimes of incarceration for insanity: William Battie’s 
private confi nement (in St Luke’s) for vitiated senses and John Monro’s public 
display (in Bedlam) for vitiated judgment, both of which led to mentally disabled 
people being tortured. What is most ironic about this is that it was Battie and 
Monro who testifi ed to the 1763 House of Commons Report on the state of 
madhouses in England, a trade in which both had made vast fortunes, and which 
neither wanted to be questioned about their running private prisons for the incar-
ceration of unwanted relatives.
L i v i n g  w i t h  D i s a b i l i t y — E x p e r i e n t i a l  E s s a y s
Not all people have left a large body of work on which to base biographical 
accounts, and with relatively few disabled people (there are, for example only 
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fi fteen blind writers noted on Eighteenth-Century Collections Online) the 
evidence is even more sparse and the lives even more evanescent. Th ese four 
essays begin to bring to light little known disabled people, or people who are 
little known for their disability, giving various forms of biographical accounts of 
Susanna Harrison, Sarah Scott, Priscilla Poynton, and Th omas Gills, who are all 
but forgotten in the academic (Scott perhaps less so) as well as the public con-
sciousness. When I was researching Th omas Gills in Bury St. Edmunds, I told 
the archivists about their blind poet but none had even heard of him, though 
he sold his pamphlets at the steps of St Mary’s church every day until he died in 
1716—a few yards from their door.
Jamie Kinsley’s essay on the devout poetry of Susanna Harrison explores the 
way this pain-wracked poet followed successfully the economic example of another 
religious poet, Elizabeth Singer Rowe, while at the same time giving a voice to her 
own suff ering and her methods of coping with daily unmitigated pain. Th e result 
gives us an extraordinarily personal experience of disability. What is interesting is 
how Harrison writes for a supportive coterie, and how her longing to be always a 
part of the public worship of her congregational community is necessary for her 
understanding of her sense of herself as part of a divine family. In this sense, Harri-
son’s poetry gives us a glimpse of what Lennard J. Davis has suggested is the period 
in which the signifi ers for disability begin shifting from perceived vice to perceived 
virtue. At the same time the fact that Harrison’s poems were edited by her minis-
ter and presented as the work of a poor disabled poet, we might fi nd a reason for 
the shift was connected with the economics of charity rather than the purported 
divine purpose of using the suff ering of the disabled body as an example of the 
suff ering of Jesus: a process that the essay argues marginalizes disabled people.
Jason Farr also develops Lennard J. Davis’s idea about the change in con-
sciousness about and of physical deformity during the eighteenth century from 
public spectacle to a test for virtue to overcome, using the eighteenth-century 
concept of sensibility. His essay argues against the idea of a docile minority of 
deformed people, suggesting rather William Hay’s challenge to the ugly club is 
another example of how he subverts established modes of thinking that were 
promoted by both the literary establishment, represented by Steele, and scientifi c 
thought, epitomized by Bacon. Instead, Farr argues that the writings of William 
Hay and Sarah Scott go beyond merely procuring sympathy for the disabled: they 
attempt to reconfi gure cultural perceptions about the body by extolling deformity 
as a most desirable physical condition. By rereading Sarah Scott’s novel, Agreeable 
Ugliness, Farr’s essay demonstrates that people affl  icted by facial deformity were 
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not subject to the wishes of a dominant public or familial pressure to conform, 
but used their wit and intelligence to get what they wanted.
Jess Domanico presents a study of Priscilla Poynton, a blind poet who dis-
cusses her own experience of life as a blind woman in her autobiographical poetry. 
Although noting that there are few other facts known about her life other than her 
two collections of poetry, the paper becomes a call for a full-length piece of work 
to be done on Poynton, who was part of the tradition of blind people making an 
economic life for themselves in whatever ways they could. Th e paper also notes the 
limits of the understanding of disability both in the eighteenth century and now, 
and asks that we listen to the individual explain their own disability. Domanico 
also suggests that Poynton’s “blindness is actually enabling—i.e. it enables her to 
read her own life as she envisions it.” Th is challenging essay therefore suggests that 
we can read the poet herself through her own writing about herself as an example 
of VariAbility—as the woman she was rather than as a blind prisoner of her dis-
ability. Poynton’s poetry, Domanico argues, is where we encounter Poynton read-
ing herself—and subsequently defi ning herself—as a woman writer.
My essay also gives a study of a blind poet, Th omas Gills of Bury St. Ed-
munds, who wrote poetry in order to help himself to economic independence. Th e 
essay discusses the place of literary studies in the history of disability, and argues 
that a carefully contextualized account of a disabled person can bring to light a 
great deal about the whole person working within the ebbs and fl ows of historical 
change and continuity, while remaining aware of the fact that presenting evidence 
from a variety of disparate sources, and using all the tricks and partial truths that 
the construction of a single narrative implies, the resultant “total vision” will be to 
a degree distorted. In the same vein, I argue that the language of address by the 
poor to their benefactors comprised various forms: as the example of Gills’s various 
publications and his publication strategy imply.
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